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 The posthuman was spawned within the military complex. For all its 
emancipatory potential, which Rosi Braidotti has eloquently written about and of 
which I will say more later, the armed forces of advanced western states (particularly 
the U.S.) were responsible for conjuring up its existence, funding the techno-
scientific apparatus required for its birth, sponsoring its proliferation, and subsidizing 
the diversionary apparatus (such as within entertainment industry) that has been 
central to its infiltration into the popular imaginary. As Braidotti astutely observes in 
The Posthuman (2013), “the advocates of advanced capitalism seem to be faster in 
grasping the creative potential of the posthuman than some of the well-meaning 
and progressive neo-humanism opponents of the system”.1 Indeed, defenders of 
militarism in the twenty-first century have identified the posthuman as the central 
component of the latest Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which they claim is as 
important as previous RMAs, such as the invention of gunpowder, of armoured 
vehicles, and of aerial flight. The crushing force with which the military complex has 
grasped the destructive potential of this militarised posthuman points to a very real 
crisis in posthumanist thinking and practice. 
 
 Although the new RMA has dislodged the human as the central agent in the 
waging of war, modern wars began the process. The American Civil War and the First 
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World War saw prodigious expansions in the mechanisation of killing, but the move 
towards a posthuman military really occurred during the “wizard’s war” of 1939-
1945 when, in an unprecedented fashion, scientists came to define and 
revolutionalize how war was actually fought. Initially, the revolution was not driven 
by conventional concerns (after all, scientists had long been necessary for the 
development of military technologies such as artillery pieces) but by more 
theoretical concerns associated with radar, sonar, and the atomic bomb. By the 
1950s, the Military Industrial Complex was firmly entrenched. At the end of that 
decade, nearly ten per cent of Americans in employment were working either 
directly or indirectly by the Department of Defense.2 In the 1950s, the armed forces 
and their firms consumed between 85 and 90 per cent of all goods and services 
purchased by the federal government.3 
 
 Today, however, advanced western powers no longer fight modern wars, but 
posthuman ones. As two spokesmen from the U.S. Naval War College put it in 2013, 
in order to maintain “a technical edge over potential adversaries… by fielding 
systems that enable [American forces] to deliver lethal force while minimizing the 
risk to their own forces”,4 the militarist posthuman relies on external extensions 
(technological “add-ons”) to human and non-human animals, as well as internal 
modifications of the physiological body. The range of these modifications can be 
illustrated by looking at what is being funded by the U.S. Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a central organisation in the posthuman military 
project. DARPA is dedicated to developing “materials and devices inspired by living-
systems and using these new technologies to create new military systems”. They 
feature a formidable arsenal of posthuman enhancements, from the “Warrior Web” 
(an under-suit that enhances the ability of soldiers to carry heavy gear for long 
periods) and prosthetic products controlled by brain-machine interfaces to robots, 
microelectromechanical systems, and nanotechnologies.5 In true posthumanist 
fashion, they celebrate difference, heterogeneity, and flexibility, boasting about 
their “heterogeneous Mobile Military Networking Infrastructure”, “dynamic, 
autonomous, airborne, terrestrial, and littoral assets”, and “transient addresses”.6 
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They insist that “DARPA is well on its way to creating a Bio-Revolution” which will 
“help warfighters”.7 
 
Central to the militarist project is a decentring of the human made possible 
through technology. For advanced military states, armed conflicts are waged by 
posthumans, that is, by humachines. Warbots – a generic term for drones, robotic 
weapons, unmanned vehicles, and suchlike – are at the heart of twenty-first century 
aggression. In the words of a headline in The Economist: “The Future of Warfare: 
Select Enemy. Delete”.8 During “Operation Enduring Freedom” and “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom”, unmanned aircraft systems as part of the U.S.-led coalition flew almost 
half a million hours and unmanned ground vehicles conducted over 30,000 missions 
during which they detected and neutralized over 15,000 IEDs (improvised explosive 
devices).9 While the U.S. Department of Defense had only 50 unmanned aircraft in 
2000; by October 2009, they had 6,800 and were expanding (in 2010, the 
Department requested a further $6.1 billion for new unmanned systems).10 
 
From the tiny “Wasp” drone, which is small enough for a soldier to toss into 
the air like a mobile aeroplane to discover what might be behind a wall or hill, to the 
44-foot long Global Hawk, which flies at 60,000 feet and can remain airborne for 35 
hours, human-machine systems dominate “Bellum Americanum”. The drone pilot – 
operating thousands of miles from his target – is a networked being, connected to 
local, national, and global computer and satellite systems, including being streamed 
directly into the offices of the U.S. Secretary of State for Defense and the President. 
To ensure effective combatant dominance, the posthuman drone pilot has to allow 
the machine to get under his skin; he has to feel the machine in order to effectively 
navigate or fly it. This was what Matt Martin (an experienced pilot of conventional 
warplanes) learnt when being taught to fly the Predator drone. He recalled being 
yelled at by his instructor: “You’re in that airplane, Captain Martin. Feel it”. Martin 
commented that he “knew how an airplane was supposed to feel – and sitting in a 
GCS [ground control station], for all it looked like a flight cockpit, wasn’t it”. In an 
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airborne plane, pilots “felt gusts of wind, turbulence, a change in the aircraft’s 
relative position to the ground” but the Predator pilot “had no such connections to 
his plane”. Martin was only considered to be fully trained after he was observed 
crouching forward to better see over the nose of the aircraft when landing (“a futile 
gesture when flying an RPA [remotely piloted aircraft]”. “Not too bad, shithead”, was 
the way his instructor complimented him.11 Martin’s physiological body was a 
constructed entity; it had to be regulated through intensive military training. 
Medical, legal, economic, and political forces systematically altered his posture, 
affect, and proprioception. The technological affordances of the computer console 
extended his body boundaries. In other words, despite the networked, techno-
scientific interface, the posthuman military does not so much eradicate the subject 
but extends it.  
 
One result is the deterritorialization of warfare. This happens in a number of 
different ways. One of the most basic is the way posthuman militarists fail to 
recognize state-borders. Drones conduct their killings without regard for national 
territories or liberal notions of sovereignty. They exercise persistent surveillance 
over large areas of the globe. This has significant implications for the traditional legal 
constructions of human rights and for humanitarian law. As Hannah Arendt astutely 
observed in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973), human rights have customarily 
been associated with nation-states: personhood is both conferred and revoked by 
sovereign leaders.12 This is no longer the case. If the human of “human rights talk” is 
defined by citizenship, the posthuman military state denies this by eradicating the 
relevance of national boundaries or categories of citizens. 
 
Humanitarian law also falters under this deterritorialized form of warfare. In 
Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century 
(2009), Singer quoted a proponent of military robotics as saying that “the robot is 
our answer to the suicide bomber”.13 In 2011, a commentator in the Harvard 
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National Security Journal noted that this “analogy between a robot and a suicide 
bomber is a chilling portent of post-human warfare”. He explained that 
 
 both are the extremities of war: present in combat, lethal, and 
neither is entitled to the protections of IHL [International 
Humanitarian Law]. In short, they are objects of war not 
contemplated by humanitarian law, and place discourses of 
“humanity” in question. They are post-humanitarian concerns.14 
 
In other words, the “jus in bello” in humanitarian law is based on the idea of an 
active, willing human agent who can be held accountable for lethal decisions made 
in war. With the increase in semi-autonomous machines – and the future risk of fully 
autonomous machines charged with making decisions about whom to kill – the basis 
of humanitarian law is undercut. In this way, the posthuman has liberated itself not 
only from the constraints thrown over it by “nature” but also from the constraints of 
humanist ideology that insists (in theory although not in practice) on the application 
of humanitarian law in armed conflicts. 
 
Deterritorialized warfare is not the only similarity between the posthuman 
military and the terrorist: the other is the absence of temporal limits. For both, the 
aims are unlimited (thus precluding any decisive victory – indeed, rendering the 
concept of “victory” redundant) and the means are bounded only by capacity and 
imagination. Both the terrorist and advanced western militaries understand that 
their violence is futile in a liberal human sense: the suicide bomber who kills 
revellers in the Bali nightclub and the drone pilot who targets him victims from 
60,000 feet in the sky are not attempting to change people’s minds or even to effect 
political change. Their state of war is indefinite; it is criminal action and police 
reaction masquerading as war.  
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 Posthuman violence also extends far beyond the body of the soldier (or, in 
current military jargon, “Warfighters”) and his physical context, creating a schizoid 
subject. This was what Predator-navigator Martin alluded to time and again in his 
memoir. He recalled how the typical drone-operative would  
 
commute to work in rush-hour traffic [in Nevada], slip into a seat in 
front of a bank of computers, “fly” a warplane to shoot missiles at an 
enemy thousands of miles away, and then pick up the kids from 
school or a gallon of milk at the grocery store on his way home for 
dinner.15 
 
 In addition to technological extensions to the human, which enable 
“Warfighters” to vastly exceed previous physiological capabilities, there are also 
technologies which chemically alter brain states. Psychopharmacology has become a 
significant area of research and practice in posthuman militaries. Amongst other 
things, it involves administering steroids to enhance physical traits like strength and 
endurance and “Go Pills”, which contain the stimulant dexamphetamine. The latter 
are commonly used in the U.S. Air Force. Although these pills are said to be 
voluntary (and pilots have to sign a document to that effect), refusing to take them 
could result in a pilot being banned from flying, thus jeopardizing his career in the Air 
Force.16 Research is also being conducted into what is popularly known as the “anti-
remorse pill”, aimed at eradicating the fear of engaging the enemy as well as the 
guilt arising from killing. As Leon Kass (chairman of the President’s Council on 
Bioethics) explained, “It’s the morning-after pill for just about anything that 
produces regret, remorse, pain, or guilt”.17 A national coordinator for Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War put it more succinctly: scientists were creating an “anti-
morality pill”.18  
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 The Warfighter is enhanced by posthuman technologies and pharmaceuticals 
forged in the military-industrial complex of the twenty-first century. However, this 
aggressor is encouraged to view his victims as posthuman too. Seen through the 
pixeled computer screen, the distinction between the life of the sentient body and 
the avatar is blurred. Biological and simulated existence becomes interchangeable. 
In front of his computer screens in Reno (Nevada), drone navigator Martin reflected 
on how it felt to be “among the first generation of soldiers working with robots to 
wage war”. He confessed to feeling a  
 
thrill… at the moment I prepared to squeeze the trigger…. It had not 
been quite real, even afterwards…. The ability to kill people from such 
great distances, playing God, widened the gap between the reality of 
war and out perception of it. It was almost like watching an NFL game 
of TV with its tiny figures on the screen….. It could even be mildly 
entertaining.19 
 
He admitted that this kind of killing was indistinguishable to “simulated combat, like 
the computer game Civilization”.20 When he launched a missile he explained that “I 
experienced the by-now-familiar pixilation of the screen as the missile launched 
from its rail to briefly interrupt the return link” before, 30 seconds later, “the Papa 
streaked straight down to impact between [two men]. They never knew what hit 
them”. He admitted “Sometimes I felt like God hurling thunderbolts from afar”.21  
 
Sergeant Sinque Swales from Chesterfield (Virginia) made a similar comment. 
He observed that war gaming was crucial to his ability to shoot a .50-calibre machine 
gun at Iraqi insurgents in the northern town of Mosul. He recalled that  
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It felt like I was in a big video game. It didn’t even faze me, shooting 
back. It was just natural instinct. Boom! Boom! Boom! Boom!... I 
couldn’t believe I was seeing this. It was like “Halo”. It didn’t even 
seem real, but it was real.22  
 
As David Bartlett (former chief of operations at the Defense Modelling and 
Simulation Office and the creator of the video game and training device Marine 
Doom) explained, when the time came for Swales to kill in real life  
 
he was ready to do that…. His experience leading up to that time, 
through on-the-ground training and playing “Halo”, and whatever 
else, enabled him to execute. His situation awareness was up. He 
knew what he had to do. He had done it before – or something like 
it.23  
 
The posthuman gaze streamed through entertaining war games united 
cybernetically-enhanced super-soldiers in Halo and Reno, Mosul and Chesterfield. 
 
In such posthuman settings, spectacle is paramount. This point was made by 
Jean Baudrillard in Simulacra and Simulation as long ago as 1995 but, since then, has 
taken on new life with the development of particularly intimate connections 
between the military and the entertainment industries. The decisive year was 1999 
when the National Academy of Sciences hosted a workshop on simulation aimed at 
encouraging co-operation between the defence and entertainment industries. After 
its report, a $45 million partnership was established between the army and the 
University of Southern California to establish the Institute for Creative Technologies 
(ICT).24 In 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense extended ICT’s contract to 2014 by 
giving it a further $135 million.25 The ICT brings together military specialists, 
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computer scientists, social scientists, writers, artists, and cinematographers. 
Although the aim is to improve military modeling and simulations, the initiative is 
also part of an attempt to give a more modern face to the armed services. By 2011, 
the ICT estimates that over 75,000 soldiers had been trained using the innovative 
ICT-developed technologies.26 Importantly, war gaming does not only move from 
barracks to bedrooms. It also moves in the other direction: commercially available 
war games are adopted by military-training regimes. As the U.S. Secretary of the 
Army Louis Caldera boasted in 1999, the ICT is “a joint effort of the Army, the 
entertainment industry and academe – an innovative team to advance dazzling new 
media and ultimately benefit training and education for everyone in America”.27 
Significantly, Caldera did not see the cooperation as benefiting the military forces 
solely, but all of society. It is a typical assumption, and not unrealistic given the 
snowballing militarization of American life. 
 
What was so pioneering about the ICT initiative? Prior to its establishment, 
military simulations had focused primarily on developing applications that could 
advance strategic planning, improve procedural systems, and introduce guidelines 
concerning military doctrine. In contrast, ICT researchers recognized that humans 
were emotional beings. They sought to inject feelings and interpersonal relationships 
into decision-making and battle-conduct.28 They believed that efficient military 
organizations needed to be sensitive to the emotional lives of everyone from the 
raw recruit to the most seasoned commanding officer. Environmental thrills, 
emotional reactions, and intellectual challenges were necessary to spur posthuman 
Warfighters to effective techno-scientific engagement with the enemy.29  
 
In September 2004, the ICT released the first military training application 
developed for a commercial game console: this was Full Spectrum Warrior, a squad-
based, tactical-action game. They developed this game in close cooperation with the 
U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning in Georgia in order “to ensure content 
fidelity”, but they also filmed real-life soldiers in order to create their computer 
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character animations.30 It is no coincidence that the game was set in a fictional place 
in the Middle East and is based on the “war against terror”. Its purpose is to train 
infantry soldiers in asymmetrical, posthuman warfare. As ICT spokesmen insist time 
and again, the new kinds of war demands different interactions within gaming 
environments. It is one of many games that serves a dual function as training 
programme for the military and entertainment for a wider (primarily male) public.  
 
 The ICT also cooperates with commercial toy makers, enabling them to 
produce imitation weapons that exactly matched their lethal counterparts.31 Once 
again, the exchange goes both ways: real-life weapons are also modeled on toys. 
Thus, when the Marines used the Dragon Eye remote controlled reconnaissance air 
vehicle in Iraq, they were probably unaware that model planes had inspired the 
bungee cord that launched it.32  
 
Gaming is profoundly relevant to the citizen’s political life. By blurring 
entertainment and war – “militainment” or, in J. Der Derian’s coinage, the “military-
industrial-entertainment-complex”33 – citizens come to expect war without end. 
Entertainment has become a way of creating militarized citizens. The war is sanitized 
for easy consumption. We are all turned into citizen-soldiers – no longer viewing the 
war but being embedded into it, albeit virtually. This brings war closer in some 
aspects but at the same time further decontextualises it. 
 
 Finally, this posthuman military is classed, racialised, and gendered. 
Technology is not autonomous of cultural production. American “Warfighters” are 
constantly enthusing over the stark contrast between their god-like capacities to kill 
by means of drone warfare in comparison to the puny resources available to mere 
“insurgents” with their beaten-up trucks and crude weapons. Less-than-human 
combatants are excluded from both the productive and destructive symbiosis of the 
human and the technological. The new connections between bodies and 
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technologies are invested with power that is already set in place. This militarized 
posthuman-becoming is even available to women in advanced western states. 
Recruiting such women has become a major task for the U.S. military, even if the 
model remains male (as in U.S. Army advertisements that proudly state that “Our 
Best Men are Women”).34 We cannot assume that the technologies and networks 
essential to the posthuman project will be universal or equitably distributed. 
Although the technologies upon which the posthuman military depends will 
eventually be adopted widely, the “others” are not likely to “catch up” in the near 
future. After all, at the individual level and in terms of global economic networks, the 
posthuman is a late-capitalist project, requiring vast resources. It is a project that is 
committed to an extreme form of rationalist, technologist, and consumerist 
ideology. It is not able to escape from the violence of late global capitalism because 
it is a product of that violence.  
 
The posthuman of the military – the militarist, masculine cyborg – is the 
opposite of Braidotti’s vison of the cyberfeminist. The picture I have drawn of the 
posthuman as a creation of the military complex and as central to contemporary 
violence is depressing. As Braidotti observed in Transpositions, “the potentially 
innovative, de-terrirtorializing impact of the new technologies is hampered and 
turned down by the reassertion of the gravitational pull of old and established 
values”.35 She is very careful to insist that her emphasis on the affirmative praxis of 
posthumanism “does not deny the reality of horrors, violence and destruction” but 
she identifies something beyond violence.36 
 
What is to be done? Can we rehabilitate the toxic genealogy of the 
posthuman? The time to re-biologise the posthuman and its victims by reinstating 
binaries such as human/machine or by returning to some notions of humanity or 
either an innate or constructed human-ness is over. The liberal humanist project is 
dead already, and it died giving birth to the posthuman. We can’t go back. We don’t 
want to either. Braidotti calls upon feminists to rethink the posthuman moment. She 
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offers the best chance of reviving the potential of critical posthumanism. She calls on 
people – including historians, who resolutely attempt to look backwards into “what 
used to be” – to engage with the present and future or, as she puts it, to grapple 
“with existing social and political givens – including the horrors of our times – in 
order to bring about counter-effects, that is to say unexpected consequences and 
transformations”. We need to become “worthy of the times” and confident of our 
ability to “construct[] positivity, thus propelling new social conditions and relations 
into being, out of injury and pain”.37 At a time when thanatopolitical practices 
dominate military research and practice, scholars need to follow Braidotti’s nomadic 
journey towards a critical posthumanism.  
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